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In Dec 1953 after Krushchev criticized the Soviet Press, a campaign was begun in the USSR which showed that the newspapers were generally offering nothing more to the reader than official communiques & were not sources of news. The reasons for this change in attitude toward the press were due, on the one hand, to the fact that the diminishing interest in the press was reducing its effectiveness as a weapon of the Party, & on the other, to the desire that the process of liberalization, thought to be inevitable, should be conducted within the framework of the party & not outside of it. Despite important developments in the way of news, the Party never relinquished control over the press, a fact which became obvious when no mention was made of the happenings in Hungary until long after those events had occurred. 2 obstacles oppose themselves to the development of newsworthy characteristics in the Soviet Press: all news must necessarily contribute to the improvement of the reader; the press was created in connection with admin've agencies, pol'al & union groups, & remains extremely specialized. This specialization led inevitably to uniformity since, outside its own field, the newspapers merely quoted the same articles verbatim. The reform took place while stating that neither the structure nor the objectives of the press needed to be modified. The change dealt mainly with those things which might be considered informative or dangerous. A certain number of problems were dealt with in the area of internat & internal problems & objectivity was increased. Furthermore, writers were no longer content to simply supply eulogies on the activities of their enterprises but engaged in criticisms. Finally, the number of letters from readers increased, & the tone of criticism became more apparent. An effort to improve the presentation of news & to introduce a wider variety of such news has been attempted, but so far is a long way from being greatly effective. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

If the struggle for power becomes a matter of decision for a pol'al party or pol'al figure in a democracy, the ensuing action may not be in accord with previous behavior. The British pol'al scene shows an actual example of this kind of applied psychol. The Suez affair & its subsequent crisis created a serious psychol'al crisis in GB, a crisis so severe that Harold Macmillan had to deal with it by original methods. Forced to take measures, such as the one giving British shipowners the right to again use the canal, which really indicate the decline in British power, he nevertheless succeeded in restoring public confidence. He took his cabinet ministers in hand by allowing them a large measure of individual initiative, unlike Eden who supervised the most minute details of admin'tion. His authority over the Conservative party was very rapidly reaffirmed, to the point where he was able to force Lord Salisbury to leave the Cabinet. In the end he managed to get the Conservatives in Parliament behind him, by channeling their dislike toward the Labor Party, & by also directing their animosity toward the US & the UN. His apparent calm & indifference allowed him to take a neutral position toward these scapegoats, leaving vindictiveness to his partisans by this device. All of his efforts, however, did not succeed in restoring his prestige with the public who are less sensitive to the psychol'al techniques of the leader than the politicians, & who measure a politician in terms of his accomplishments, which have not been, so far very favorable. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.