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Introduction -- From 'good governance' to governance that works -- The country contexts -- Maternal health : why is Rwanda doing better than Malawi, Niger and Uganda? -- The politics of policy incoherence and provider indiscipline -- The space for local problem-solving and practical hybridity -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- index.

This books analyzes international financial markets and environmental problems as typical examples of transnational common goods and considers the factors affecting the strategic constellations of countries in common goods provision, in particular the strategic effects of multi-level governance.

Collective action problems are ubiquitous in situations involving human interactions and therefore lie at the heart of economy and political science. In one of the most salient statements on this topic, Elinor Ostrom, co-recipient of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, even claims that the theory of collective action is the central subject of political science". The collection of essays presented in this timely volume targets the problem of collective action from both a theoretical and applied perspective. Its multidisciplinary approach makes it a valuable reading for students

This book examines how nations and other key participants in the global community address problems requiring collective action. The global community has achieved some successes, such as eradicating smallpox, but other efforts to coordinate nations' actions, such as the reduction of drug trafficking, have not been sufficient. This book identifies the factors that promote or inhibit successful collective action at the regional and global level for an ever-growing set of challenges stemming from augmented cross-border flows associated with globalization. Modern principles of collective action are identified and applied to a host of global challenges, including promoting global health, providing foreign assistance, controlling rogue nations, limiting transnational terrorism, and intervening in civil wars. Because many of these concerns involve strategic interactions where choices and consequences are dependent on one's own and others' actions, the book relies, in places, on elementary game theory that is fully introduced for the uninitiated reader

Michael Gilligan argues that the liberalization of trade policy has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries solving the collective action problems of supporters of free trade. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization. Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy as well as in quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. Empowering Exporters should appeal to political scientists, economists, and policymakers who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy

Collective Action 2.0: The Impact of Social Media on Collective Action provides a balanced look into how ICTs leverage and interact with collective action through avoiding technological determinism, utopianism, and fundamentalism, which impacts the current discourse. Recent events in different authoritarian regimes, such as Iran and Egypt, have drawn global attention to a developing phenomenon in collective action: people tend to organize through different social media platforms for political protest and resistance. This phenomenon describes a change in social structure and behavior tied to Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Social media platforms have been used to leverage collective action, which, in some cases, has arguable led to political revolution. The phenomenon also indicates that the way information is organized affects the organization of social structures with which it interacts. The phenomenon also has another side, namely the use of social media for activist suppression, state surveillance, or for the mobilization of collective action towards undesirable ends. Analyzes social media and collective action in a deep and balanced mannerPresents an account avoiding technological determinism, utopianism, and fundamentalismConsiders the underlying theory behind quick-paced social mediaTakes an interdisciplinary approach that will resonate with all those interested in social media and collective action, regardless of field specialty

""TItle Page""; ""Copyright""; ""Contents""; ""Contributors""; ""Introduction""; ""Weâ#x80;#x99;re All Immigrants""; ""Are We Post-Racial?""; ""Native Land""; ""Water""; ""LGBTQIA Equality""; ""Ableism""; ""White Supremacy""; ""Life for Native Peoples""; ""Sexual Violence""; ""Transgender Equality""; ""The Gender Wage Gap""; ""Equality and Equity""; ""Native Peoples' Rights""; ""Women in Government""; ""Contributions of Immigrants""; ""Bullying of LGBTQIA Youth""; ""Mental Health""; ""Women in Poverty""; ""Prison Industrial Complex""; ""War on Drugs""; ""Race and Incarceration""

In Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy, William D. Ferguson presents a comprehensive political economy text aimed at advanced undergraduates in economics and graduate students in the social sciences. The text utilizes collective action as a unifying concept, arguing that collective-action problems lie at the foundation of market success, market failure, economic development, and the motivations for policy. Ferguson draws on information economics, social preference theory, cognition theory, institutional economics, as well as political and policy theory to develop this approach. The text uses classical, evolutionary, and epistemic game theory, along with basic social network analysis, as modeling frameworks. These models effectively bind the ideas presented, generating a coherent theoretic approach to political economy that stresses sometimes overlooked implications

Schon vor mehr als 100 Jahren war das Thema der Schuldenrestrukturierung und ein damit verbundener geregelter Rahmenprozess für die Restrukturierung der Schulden insolventer Emittenten aktuell. Ein Souverän im 21. Jahrhundert ist als Emittent mit ähnlichen Problemen konfrontiert wie einer von Unternehmens- oder Eisenbahnanleihen im frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Die Verwendung von Anleihen als Instrument der Schuldenaufnahme bringt im Gegensatz zu Kreditgläubigern eine breit gestreute Gläubigerbasis mit sich. Damit steigt das Koordinationsproblem zwischen Gläubiger und Schuldner, aber auch den Gläubigern untereinander. Die Gläubiger müssen sich auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner in der Restrukturierung einigen. Collective action clauses (CACs) werden in Staatsanleihen verwendet, seitdem sie im 19. Jahrhundert in englischen Unternehmensanleihen erstmals eingebunden wurden. Traditionell werden CACs in Anleihen nach englischem Recht, aber auch in Anleihen nach japanischem und luxemburgischem Recht verwendet. In Anleihen nach deutschem Recht sind sie traditionell nicht enthalten. In Folge der Debatte um einen geordneten Restrukturierungsprozess sind CACs seit Anfang 2003 auch in Anleihen Souveräner, die nach New Yorker Recht emittiert wurden, enthalten. Der Trust Indenture Act (TIA) von 1939 untersagt die Verwendung von Mehrheitswahlklauseln zur Änderungen von Anleihebedingungen in amerikanischen Anleihen. Änderungen von Anleihebedingungen bedürfen nach dem TIA der Einstimmigkeit der Anleihegläubiger. Die CACs sind ein Bündel von Klauseln, die unter anderem spezifizieren wer die Gläubiger in Verhandlungen repräsentiert. Sie enthalten genau beschriebene Mehrheitswahlklauseln (majority action clauses) für die Änderung von Vertragsbedingungen, die sowohl die finanzielle Seite von Anleihen, als auch nichtfinanzielle Anleihebedingungen betreffen (reserved und non-reserved matters). Zudem senken diese Klauseln den Anreiz bzw. die Möglichkeit einzelner Gläubiger gegen den Schuldner gerichtlich vorzugehen, um ihre Forderungen einzuklagen. CACs erhöhen die Erlösquote einer Umschuldung, indem die Dauer der Restrukturierung und die Prozesskosten der Gläubiger reduziert werden. Diese Klauseln entfalten ihre Wirkung erst wenn der Schuldner seinen Zahlungsverpflichtungen nicht nachkommt. Sie haben keinen Einfluss auf die Tragfähigkeit oder Nichttragfähigkeit der Schulden des Emittenten. Eine Eigenschaft der CACs ist, dass sie den Inhalt der Restrukturierung nicht bestimmen, sondern nur einen geordneten Rahmen schaffen, in dem der Inhalt der Restrukturierung von den Vertragsparteien ausgehandelt werden kann. Internationale Anleihen verdrängten in den 1990er Jahren syndizierte Bankkredite schnell als Hauptfinanzierungsquelle für Emerging-Market-Länder (EML). Eurobonds machten in den 1980ern vier Prozent der internationalen Schuldenaufnahme von EMLs und heute einen Anteil von 90 Prozent aus. Im Vergleich zwischen heute und den 1980ern emittierten nicht nur Länder Anleihen mit einem guten Kreditrating, sondern auch Schwellenländer mit einer niedrigen Kreditqualität, die im Laufe der 1990er Zugang zum internationalen Finanzmarkt bekamen. Seitdem öffentlich überwachte Anleihen handelbar sind, sind sie preiswerter und dadurch die präferierte Quelle zur langfristigen Finanzierung geworden. Hinzu kam die Bildung eines liquiden Marktes für Anleihen durch Schuldenswaps in Bradyanleihen Ende der 1980er. CACs schaffen innerhalb einer Anleihe ein Umschuldungsverfahren, eine Art Mikroinsolvenzverfahren für die betreffende Anleihe (Anleihetranche). Sofern alle Anleihen eines Staates CACs enthalten, kann in der Summe ein äquivalentes allgemein verbindliches Insolvenzverfahren gebildet werden. Somit bieten CACs vertragliche Regeln als Ersatz für ein internationales Insolvenzrecht für Staaten, welches die gleichen Kernfunktionen eines Insolvenzrechtes erfüllen muss: Organisation, Erhaltung und Verteilung. Die Effizienz von Vertragsklauseln als Hilfsmittel für eine Schuldenrestrukturierung ist entscheidend von ihrem Verbreitungsgrad abhängig. Aus diesem Grund ist es erforderlich, dass zumindest auf den wichtigsten Finanzmarktplätzen solche Klauseln Marktpraxis sind. Nach Sachs könnten durch eine verbesserte Ausgestaltung von Verträgen einer der Gründe für Ineffizienz und Wohlfahrtsverlusten in den internationalen Finanzmärkten vermieden werden.

Cover Page -- Halftitle Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- AldineTransaction Introduction -- Content Page -- Preface -- 1 Mathematics of Social Action -- Causal processes -- Purposive action -- Causal theory and models of action -- Bernoulli events and the Poisson process -- Extensions of Bernoulli trials -- The deficient diagonal, and three extensions of Markov chains -- Extensions of Bernoulli trials: heterogeneity in response probabilities -- Extensions of the Poisson process: continuous-time Markov process -- The deficient diagonal: response unreliability -- Dependence of transition rates on other factors -- Transition rates dependent on numbers of preceding events -- Initiated and terminating processes -- Purposive action theory -- 2 Concepts of Rational Action -- Rational action under varying circumstances -- 3 Collective Actions -- Definitions -- Structural definitions -- A framework for collective action -- The problem of maximization -- The probabilistic decision rule -- 4 Further Concepts and Applications -- Additional concepts -- List of concepts in the theory -- Examples of applications -- The problem of data Appendix: Notes on Trad 11: Computer program to solve for equilibrium -- 5 The Dynamic System, and Other Elaborations -- Dynamics and the movement to equilibrium -- Maximization versus proportional allocation of interests -- Relaxing the probabilistic decision rule -- Sequential introduction of events -- Multi-stage decision processes Appendix: Notes on Trad 12: Computer program for systems of vote exchange -- References -- Computer Program and Output -- Index

"This book develops a theory of climate cooperation designed for concerted action, which emphasises the role and function of collectives in achieving shared climate goals. In debates on climate change action, research focuses on three major goals: on mitigation, on adaptation and on transformation. Even though these goals are accepted, concerted action is still difficult to realize. Climate Justice and Collective Action provides an analysis of why this is the case and develops a theory of climate cooperation designed to overcome the existing roadblocks. Angela Kallhoff starts with a thorough analysis of failures of collective action in the context of climate change action. Taking inspiration from theories of water cooperation, she then establishes a theory of joint action that reframes climate goals as shared goals and highlights the importance of adhering to principles of fairness. This also includes an exploration of the normative claims working in the background of climate cooperation. Finally, Kallhoff puts forward proposals for a fair allocation of duties to cooperate with respect to climate goals. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of climate action, climate justice, environmental sociology and environmental philosophy and ethics more broadly"--

"Past archaeological literature on cooperation theory has emphasized competition's role in cultural evolution. As a result, bottom-up possibilities for group cooperation have been under-theorized in favor of models stressing top-down leadership, and evidence from a range of disciplines has demonstrated that humans effectively sustain cooperative undertakings through a number of social norms and institutions. Cooperation and Collective Action is the first volume to focus on the use of archaeological evidence to understand cooperation and collective action. Disentangling the motivations and institutions that foster group cooperation among competitive individuals remains a great conundrum in evolutionary theory. The breadth and material focus of archaeology provide a much-needed complement to existing research on cooperation and collective action, which thus far has relied largely on game-theoretic modeling, surveys of college students from affluent countries, brief ethnographic experiments, and limited historic cases. In Cooperation and Collective Action, diverse case studies address the evolution of the emergence of norms, institutions, and symbols in complex societies over the last 10,000 years. This book is an important contribution to the literature on cooperation in human societies and will appeal to archaeologists and other scholars interested in cooperation research"--