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In the present article the author starts off with a discussion of the Barcelona process and the main reason for its failure: namely the fragility of the Oslo peace process. The second topic focuses on the genesis of the Union for the Mediterranean of July 2008 as a follow-up of the Euromediterranean Partnership dated 1995, and its relevance for both its North African and European shores. Included are the institutional and procedural structures, and an analysis of the place conflict resolution holds within the Union for the Mediterranean, the latter illustrated by the recent Gaza War. O. van Zijl

Folkemordet i Srebrenica i juli 1995 opprørte en hel verden. Siden 1992, da krigen brøt ut, hadde Bosnia-Hercegovina vært under internasjonalt oppsyn. Artikkelen drøfter hvordan folkemord og grove krigsforbrytelser kunne foregå i årevis uten å bli stanset. Fokus er på den rolle de internasjonale faktorene spilte – FN, EU, Nato og stormaktene. Hvorfor var det så stor motstand mot bruk av makt? Delvis kan det ha vært på grunn av manglende forståelse av hva som skjedde, en oppfatning av at Balkan var preget av århundregammelt hat. Noen vestlige land hadde sine egne interesser i området. For vestlige politikere var det enkleste ikke å gjøre noe. FN sendte fredsbevarende styrker til et land i krig, noe som var katastrofalt for styrkene selv og for FNs prestisje. De tiltakene som ble satt i verk, som Sikkerhetsrådets resolusjoner, økonomiske sanksjoner, våpenembargo, FN-sikrede områder og flyforbud, førte ikke til at krigshandlingene avtok. Også mange norske politikere var sterkt imot militær inngripen. Den serbiske hæren var for sterk, en militær løsning var ikke mulig. Dette viste seg å være feil. Folkemordet i Srebrenica fikk FN og Nato til å gå inn for maktbruk i september 1995. En begrenset militær aksjon var nok til å få slutt på krigen, og reelle fredsforhandlinger kunne begynne.
Abstract in English: Srebrenica 25 Years After – How Could the Genocide Happen?
The genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 shocked the world. Since 1992, when the war broke out, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been supervised by the international community. The article discusses why genocide and crimes against humanity could happen without being stopped. Focus is on the role of the relevant international participants, the UN, the EU, NATO and the great powers. Why was there a strong opposition against use of force? It was partly due to weak understanding of what was going on, a concept of the Balkans as a region of inherent centuries-old hatred. Some Western states had their own interests in the region. For Western politicians the easiest way was to do nothing. The UN sent peacekeepers to a country at war, which turned out to be a catastrophe for the peacekeepers and for the prestige of the UN. Measures like Security Council resolutions, economic sanctions, arms embargo, safe havens and no-fly zones did not work. Many Norwegian politicians were strongly opposed to military intervention. The Serbian army was too strong, a military solution was not possible. This turned out to be wrong. The genocide in Srebrenica triggered the use of force by the UN and NATO in September 1995. A limited military action was enough to end the war, after which real peace talks could start.

The question whether the Belgian foreign policy is marked by a continuity or break between the first & second turns of Guy Verhofstadt as a prime minister of this country's governments is addressed, surveying developments in the 1999-2004 period & scrutinizing the rhetorical declarations & concrete initiatives "on the ground" by the foreign minister Louis Michel. The diplomatic style of the first & second administrations are compared, & the principles & directions of Belgian foreign policy in 2004 are assessed in the context of the state of political affairs on the global arena, with special attention to the split between the EU & US on the war in Iraq, the division inside the former vis-a-vis supporting or opposing US intervention in this Middle Eastern country, & the recent troubles the EU experiences with greater degree of political integration, projecting also into a lack of coherent, uniform foreign policy on the supranational level. Some of the major issues the Belgian foreign policy must deal in 2004 & beyond are identified: securing democratic & peaceful governance in Central Africa, responding to the anti-Belgian campaign conducted by the US, & supporting the process of strengthening the EU position as a relevant actor on the geopolitical stage. Z. Dubiel

An overview of Belgian policy making & implementation targeting countries of the African continent through either bilateral agreements or cooperation in projects launched by international organizations. Belgian African policy is placed in the larger geopolitical context, discussing the legacy of the Cold War, the country's historical ties with the Central African region (Zaire, Burundi, & Rwanda), & current structures & institutions available in the European Union & on the international arena (eg, the World Bank) within which the Belgian government can become effective either bilaterally or multilaterally in this part of Africa. The modernization of the ways & means through which developmental aid is dispensed in Africa is examined, considering Belgian & international initiatives & making comparisons to the traditional foci in Belgium's African policy. Five areas on which the current Belgian government concentrates on Central Africa are identified: (1) humanitarian assistance, (2) support for groups & initiatives targeting a peaceful resolution of conflicts & the enhancement of human rights in this part of the globe, (3) work on the demobilization & reintegration of former military units & ex-soldiers, (4) mobilization of donors & organizations willing to assist in securing peace in Burundi & eastern Congo (Zaire), & (5) actions on behalf of strengthening African "ownership" & diplomatic involvement in local peace initiatives. Z. Dubiel

The foreign policy of the current Belgian government led by the prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, with Louis Michel as the foreign minister, is evaluated, focusing on the country's active stance on the economic & political integration of the European countries & peaceful resolution of conflicts in Central Africa. Belgium's unwavering support & relentless efforts on behalf of the European Union (EU) intensified even more as the country assumed the organization's chairmanship in May 2001, & Michel's personal involvement & physical presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) & the Great Lakes region (Rwanda & Burundi) testify to the shift by the current government toward proactive diplomacy by Belgium toward its former colony & trust territory. The ethical dimension of Belgian foreign policy is noted, mentioning the country position on human rights, support for the International Tribunal in the Hague, & the moral prerogatives followed in the Pinochet, Haider, & Berlusconi controversies. It is observed, however, that many of the country's initiatives abroad may be undercut by the government unwillingness to back its policies with foreign economic aid. Adapted from the source document.

Belgium is a rare example of a centralist state that achieved federalism via peaceful means. This process, which was initiated in 1970 & is ongoing, is fundamentally provoked by the development of two subnations within the Belgian body: the Flemish & the Walloons. Elites within both these nationalist movements identified each other as allies in the struggle for federalization. The role & interaction of this alliance in the federalization process in Belgium are described. Modified HA