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ABSTRACTMultinational corporations can play off host governments to minimise their tax payments in the absence of internationally coordinated fiscal policies. Without a supranational enforcement agency, most tax harmonization policies are unstable because one or another signatory always has an incentive to break ranks. This produces a sub‐optimal tax harvest for a group of host governments taken as a whole. This is a collective action problem for host governments which can be stated in the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma supergame. Equilibrium cooperative solutions have been suggested for this game which do not need higher authorities to enforce them. The application of these solutions to the host governments' tax problem is discussed, with the conclusion that under certain conditions self‐policing tax harmonization agreements are possible.

MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES CAN PLAY OFF MOST GOVERNMENTS TO MINIMISE THEIR TAX PAYMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONALLY COORDINATED FISCAL POLICIES. WITHOUT A SUPRANATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOST TAX HARMONIZATION POLICIES ARE UNSTABLE BECAUSE ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY ALWAYS HAS AN INCENTIVE TO BREAK RANKS.

Collective bargaining is the US route to industrial democracy. Some unionists & others, however, have advocated a widening & deepening of the participative role of workers & unions in managerial decision-making. Examples of union-management cooperation outside of the conventional collective bargaining boundaries can be found as far back as the 1920s, but only a small number of cases have survived to the present day. Since 1970 the federal government has encouraged joint union-management committees & autonomous work group experiments to improve productivity & the quality of working life. A National Center for Productivity & Quality of Working Life has been established by Congress. A number of companies have, independently or in cooperation with unions, introduced job enrichment programs, flexible work schedules, & semiautonomous work groups. Many companies have taken advantage of tax laws benefits to adopt profit-sharing & employee stock ownership plans. Union leaders have generally been suspicious of such management schemes as well as productivity plans unless safeguards are provided for worker job security & employment conditions. They have rejected the German codetermination system of worker-directors. There appears to be little prospect of dramatic change during the foreseeable future although collective bargaining may gradually extend worker participation in managerial decision-making. Modified HA.

Collective bargaining is the American route to industrial democracy. Some unionists and others, however, have advocated a widening and deepening of the participa tive role of workers and unions in managerial decision mak ing. Examples of union-management cooperation outside of the conventional collective bargaining boundaries can be found as far back as the 1920s. But only a small number of cases have survived to the present day. Since 1970 the federal government has encouraged joint union-management committees and autonomous work group experiments to im prove productivity and the quality of working life. A National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life has been established by Congress. A number of companies have, independently or in cooperation with unions, introduced job enrichment programs, flexible work schedules, and semi- autonomous work groups. Many companies have taken ad vantage of tax law benefits to adopt profit-sharing and em ployee stock ownership plans. Union leaders have generally been suspicious of such management schemes as well as productivity plans unless safeguards are provided for worker job security and employment conditions. They have rejected the German codetermination system of worker-directors. There appears to be little prospect of dramatic change during the foreseeable future although collective bargaining may gradually extend worker participation in managerial de cision making.

One factor that has affected state & local politics since the 1960s is the growth of public sector unionism. Such unionism has been assumed to be a major cause of local & state government fiscal problems. Cross-sectional analysis of data from all 50 states for the 1960-1972 period gives reason to doubt this assumption with respect to the impact of strike activity & collective bargaining legislation in tax burdens. 2 Figures. Modified HA.

ABSTRACTOne factor that has affected state and local politics since the 1960's is the growth of public sector unionism. Conventional wisdom assumes that the "fist generation" of public unionism has been a major cause of the fiscal problems faced by many state and local governments in the 1970's. State level cross‐sectional analysis (1960–71) questions this widely held assumption with respect to the impact of strike activity and collective bargaining legislation on the tax burden across the states.

Tom Bane, chairman. ; pt.1. Age discrimination in employment; Space Age Museum; Personal services by State inmates; Tax-exempt institutions engaging in business; Garnishment of wages; Industrial safety; Mistreatment of unemployment benefits recipients; Maximum hours of work by women; Minors in agricultural employment; Inspections of Carnivals. -- pt.2. Collective bargaining in public employment. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Featherbedding is the term used by management to describe what it considers an unearned increment for work not done or uselessly performed. The worker has never denied that management is entitled to a day's work that taxes the limit of the worker's psychol'al & physiological energies short of ill health. Discussions of featherbedding, therefore, have been couched in the language of health & safety. A close analysis of the collective bargaining process, however, reveals a fundamental conflict between manag & the worker over what the worker unconsciously regards as a property right, namely, his job. The notion of a job as a property right has not yet been received as part of US mores. Analysis of the legislative & judicial treatments of featherbedding discloses the futility of such efforts. At the present time, severance payments are gaining currency for the jobs that are abolished. Such payments are regarded as consolation money by the unions; they tend to be regarded by employers as blackmail to persuade the worker to relinquish what was not his in the first place. One proposed solution to the p problem is the establishment of voluntary arbitration tribunals to define a concept in labor-manag relations parallel to the concept of eminent domain in private real estate. Such tribunals would recognize the worker's property right to his job & would define the degree to which the worker could capitalize the loss of his earning opportunity. Soc efficiency would thereby be freed of the burden of obsolete performances insisted upon by the worker who must protect his earning capacity. AA.

Conflict of Laws--Full Faith and Credit--Prior Conflicting Divorce Decrees ================= Conflict of Laws--Tax Claims of One State Held Not Enforceable in Another State ================= Constitutional Law--Discrimination--Statute Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Renting of Private Apartment Houses Does Not Violate Due Process ================= Constitutional Law--Establishment of Religion--Recitation of State Composed Prayer in Public Schools Held Unconstitutional ================= Criminal Law--Narcotics-Criminal Prosecution for Addiction Is a Cruel and Unusual Punishment Violating Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ================= Damages--Collateral Source Rule--Value of Medical Services Plaintiff Received as a Gratuity Not Allowed as Special Damages ================= Due Process--Taxation of Insurance Premiums Paid to Foreign Insurers on Property Within State ================= Federal Jurisdiction--Sovereign Immunity--Suits Against Officers of the Federal Government ================== Federal Tort Claims Act--Recovery by Federal Prisoner for Negligence of Prison Employees ================= Insurance--Products Liability Policy--Coverage Includes Damages Sustained While Replacing Defective Product ================= Labor Law--Federal Courts Have No Jurisdiction To Enjoin the Breach of a No-Strike Provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Calling for Arbitration ================= Obscenity--Mailability of Magazines Which Appeal to Homosexuals ================= Tax Liens--Federal Tax Lien Subordinated to Local Lien Which Was Included as an Expense of Sale ================= Taxation--Inheritance, Estate & Gift Taxes--A Specific Dollar Amount Held To Be a Specific Portion So as To Qualify for Marital Deduction ================= Torts--Negligent Misrepresentations in Business Transactions--Persons to Whom Duty Is Owed ================= Torts--Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting From Fear of Injury to Another ================= Workmen's Compensation--Recovery for Suicide Induced by ...

Frontmatter -- Foreword -- Table of contents -- List of tables -- List of figures -- Part one. Introduction -- Chapter I. Tax Supported Programs Available for Strikers -- Chapter II. Collective Bargaining Theory and the Role of the Strike -- Part two. The Empirical Evidence -- Chapter III. From Occasional Use to Commonplace Occurrence -- Chapter IV. Westinghouse Strike, Lester, Pennsylvania August 28, 1970 to January 25, 1971 -- Chapter V. General Motors Strike September 14—November 12, 1970 -- Chapter VI. The Prevalence of the Practice — Some Case Illustrations -- Part three. Analysis, Conclusions, and Recommendations -- Chapter VII. Cost Estimates and Possible Benefits -- Chapter VIII. Do Strikers Have a "Right" to Welfare? -- Chapter IX. Conclusions and Recommendations -- Appendix A. Major Assistance Programs -- Appendix Β. Union Strike Assistance Documents -- Index

Large natural resource projects in underdeveloped countries provide great benefits to United States investors, to host countries and to the United States itself. Yet concession agreements to exploit natural resources are notoriously controversial and notoriously unstable. This article will examine the United States national interest in guaranteeing equity investments in foreign natural resource development and will argue that concession agreements in large natural resource projects in the developing world go through a highly predictable evolution, reflecting changes in the relative bargaining positions of the foreign investors and the host governments. Initial agreements reflect the foreign company's quasi-monopolistic control over the skills necessary to bring a major operation on-line, and reflect a heavy discounting for the risk of failure. The initial agreements may also reflect the host country's ignorance of industry practices, and of international tax and accounting procedures. The result is that almost all large natural resource concessions appear, after the fact, to have been written with terms highly favorable to the foreign investor.

Federalism as a system of government has four distinct aspects: it is a constitutional-legal system, a bargaining system, a career system, & a linking system. This theoretical perspective is applied to the functioning of federalism as a linking system in Austria, utilizing data from a stratified probability sample survey of 1,958 Rs conducted in 1973 by the Instit fur empirische Socialforschung. The division of powers is unusually favorable to the central government. This system was formed out of tension between the Social Democrats, who controlled Vienna, & the Christian Social Party, which controlled most of the provinces; the compromise reached in the 1920 constitution remains largely in effect at present. Attitudes on distribution of taxes, protection of interests, influence of life, & importance of elections at the various levels are examined for the total sample & for subsamples belonging to the two major parties; attitudes are also compared across the nine provinces. Deep cleavages are evident among the provinces; parties play a complex & ambiguous role in transmitting provincial attitudes, displaying different positions in different provinces. 2 Tables, 2 Figures. W. H. Stoddard.