Suchergebnisse

Diese Sammlung von Vorträgen und Reden des Chief T. A. Akinyele zur nigerianischen Wirtschaftspolitik umfasst die Bereiche des Privatsektors, der Haushaltspolitik, der öffentlichen Verwaltung und eine gesellschaftspolitische Reflexion. Die Kernthese stellt eine Forderung nach einer Verschlankung der staatlichen Verwaltung, einer ergebnisorientierten Regierungsführung und nach einem Ausbau des Privatsektors dar. Das Werk soll sowohl Wissenschaftler, Beamte im Staatsdienst, Wirtschaftsmanager und Studierende ansprechen. (DÜI-Gbd)

Abstract
Sustainability standards are integrated and applied in global supply chains through transnational commercial contracts that have come to play a regulatory function in addition to the conventional exchange task. The design of the architecture of contracting, the coordination among contracts, and the content of sustainability terms along the chain is the result of the cooperation of different actors, led by one or more transnational corporations. The paper describes the distribution of private regulatory power according to the structures of the chains- hierarchical, relational, market -and its impact on the compliance with sustainability standards. It considers the qualification system that regulates entry, exit, and permanence in the chain and the Suppliers codes and General principles of sustainability specified in the general terms and conditions. These represent complementary direct and indirect private regulatory instruments that can be deployed to ensure compliance. The choice of instruments depends on the distribution of regulatory power among the private actors and their exercise. Privity of contract makes it often difficult if not impossible direct regulation by the chain leader and obliges decentralization of regulatory power. The analysis shows that only the complementarity between the two sets of instruments enables control of compliance in complex chains whose actors operate across different jurisdictions with the use of sanctioning and remedial powers. The article analyzes how26 principles of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness may contribute to a fair and non discriminatory exercise of private regulatory power related to the implementation of sustainability standards through contracts.

Purpose
In the past few years, researchers across the world have been attracted to corporate governance (CG) and sustainability studies in the banking space. However, inconsistencies remain, which have created a lack of alignment in existing research. To address this problem, this paper aims to re-examines the CG–bank sustainability relationship using a qualitative design, which has been underused in the field, to generate in-depth, useful and novel analysis and insights that may hide behind the numbers.

Design/methodology/approach
A qualitative inquiry was conducted using key informants in Ghana's banking industry. This study made use of purposive and snowball sampling techniques, an interview guide and the thematic approach to qualitative data analysis.

Findings
Firstly, this research finds that while larger boards do not promote bank sustainability, those who are independent and have diversified expertise and experiences do. Secondly, CEO duality can boost bank sustainability only if the CEO is actively engaged and performing. Thirdly, this study finds that foreign-owned and managed banks make more profits only if they have good knowledge of the local market.

Research limitations/implications
This research makes the call that upcoming researchers should replicate this research in other banking settings worldwide to validate the results.

Practical implications
Practical lessons for local and foreign-owned banks and their shareholders are discussed to advance the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 8.

Originality/value
This research shares novel insights that offer clarity to the literature and move the CG and sustainability fields forward.

AbstractMultilevel governance is theorized to facilitate effective policy implementation by encouraging the use of local knowledge and expertise, enabling the participation of non‐government actors, and capitalizing on the coordinating and sanctioning authority of centralized governments. Whether a particular multilevel governance arrangement achieves this, however, depends in part on the degree to which it enables coordination among governmental and non‐governmental actors representing different levels and jurisdictions. Using a comparative case study of education governance reform in the United States, this study investigates how differences in state policy implementation approach impact the structure and mode of coordination in multilevel governance systems and considers the effects this has on policy implementation processes. The results indicate that a state's implementation approach impacts coordination by structuring how different levels of government interact, share information, and influence policy. Specifically, variation in the structure of the central governing agency directly enables or restricts the influence of bottom‐up coordination from lower levels of government. The results also highlight the theoretical limitations of current binary structure models of multilevel governance (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized, top‐down vs. bottom‐up, hierarchy vs. network) for capturing important nuances in policy coordination. These findings advance the understanding of policy coordination in multilevel governance systems and inform the design of institutional arrangements that balance trade‐offs in centralization and the delegation of authority across governance systems during policy implementation.