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The purpose of this thesis is to study the European Union Economic governance system and, in particular, the analysis of the constraints imposed - by that system – on national budgetary policies. It seems particularly important, in fact, the interference between the (internal) process reform of the regulatory platform in economic and financial matters and budget - from the l. 42 and 196/2009 and with the subsequent implementing decrees of the so-called "Fiscal Federalism" - and the respect for the applicable European stability, understood as a premise (formal and substantial) to contribute to the "European Common Market" and codified also in the rules that govern the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. The reform of Title V, Part II, of the Constitution has prompted a review of skills in the field of "public finance coordination" between the various levels of government land, theoretically enhancing the role of Autonomy. In this respect, however, in order to counterbalance the effects of explosive products on the economic system by the explosion of the so-called "financial bubble" in the U.S., the material conditions of the failure to implement laws to start the process of so-called "federalization tax" - despite repeated requests made also by the Constitutional Court - was accompanied by the supervening need to harmonize the national legal framework to ensure the homogeneity of its obligations materially discipline imposed in the supranational European Union. The thesis then focused on a classic theme of studies of national and European public law, namely "monetary sovereignty" - or, more broadly, of "economic" sovereignty - and the principle of democratic representation physiologically connected to the operation of the tax and state representative, declined, however, through the wide "code" that currently governs the relationships - indeed not only economic - in the European multilevel system of government.