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"The projected impacts of climate change, not only flooding and the urban heat island, but also gradual changes, such as biodiversity loss or a reduction in the groundwater level, can become societal problems. The complex inter-relationships between stakeholders and societal coordination can be included under the term 'governance'. The attributes of climate change governance will be outlined in this chapter. Attention is focused on societal scopes for designing and regulating climate change. Firstly, the specific demands for climate change governance are presented. Subsequently, the term governance is introduced, together with its various applications, and the different approaches and concepts regarding climate change governance are discussed. The conceptualization of climate change governance is based on this spectrum. As this paper discusses, climate change governance is not an entirely new concept, but one that has many parallels with existing models for governance in other settings. Nevertheless, a re-evaluation of its role in this context still appears reasonable since climate change-related measures are characterized by specific features requiring their own regulatory framework. This includes the cooperation of different institutions and actors in addition to hierarchical forms of regulation, and describes the development of self-organizing structures. Climate change governance can therefore be described as a broad range of options of coordination concerning climate change adaptation and mitigation." (author's abstract)

New modes of managerial governance have caused universities to function more like companies and produce non-intended effects as well as imaginary contradictions. In this article, four of these contradictions are discussed to provide answers to the following research questions: Do professors have a higher commitment to their organization or to their peers in the scientific community? Which factors strengthen the affective organizational commitment? Which work environment supports intrinsic motivation at universities? Can universities provide incentives that do not crowd out intrinsic motivation? A theoretical underpinning of hypotheses will be provided, and these hypotheses will be tested using two nationwide surveys of German professors. The empirical results demonstrate that commitment to professional peers increases affective organizational commitment. In the perception of German professors, there is no contradiction between profession and organization, but the newly implemented steering instruments increase organizational commitment. In addition, the results also provide evidence that autonomy, relatedness, and perceived competence increase intrinsic teaching motivation. These findings support the Self-Determination Theory. The results also provide some evidence of a crowding-out effect of the new steering instruments and that teaching awards do not crowd out intrinsic motivation. (HRK / Abstract übernommen).

Der Autor untersucht in seinem Beitrag den Zusammenhang zwischen der institutionellen Struktur von politischen Systemen und der Qualität von Governance, die in einer demokratischen Regierung, z. B. in Präsidialsystemen und im Parlamentarismus zu beobachten ist. Er bezieht sich bei seiner Analyse der Korruptionsursachen in verschiedenen politischen Systemen auf die Theorie des soziologischen Neo-Institutionalismus, demzufolge Institutionen das Akteursverhalten beeinflussen. Er verweist unter anderem auf die Forschungsarbeiten von James G. March und Johan P. Olsen, die versucht haben, den Einfluss von Institutionen auf korruptes Verhalten herauszuarbeiten. Ein korruptes Verhalten tritt demzufolge dann auf, wenn sich entweder die zuvor bestandene Sinngebungsfunktion der Institution ändert und in einer aggregativen Institution eine individualistische Nutzenmaximierung proklamiert wird, oder wenn sie diese Sinngebungsfunktion gänzlich verliert und dadurch Orientierungslosigkeit und Unsicherheit entstehen. Einige Versuche, die Effizienz von Regierungssystemen und die Qualität der Demokratie durch "Good Governance" zu fördern, können nach den Analysen des Autors paradoxerweise auch unintendierte Folgen haben, indem sie mehr Gelegenheiten für Korruption schaffen. (ICI)

"Climate change adaptation has been called a 'wicked problem par excellence.' Wicked problems are hard to define because the formulation of the problem is the problem; they are considered a symptom of another problem; they are highly resistant to solutions and extremely interconnected with other problems. Climate change problems are even more complex because they lack a well-structured policy domain, and knowledge about climate change is uncertain and contested. Given the wicked characteristics of the climate issue and its particular challenges, the question is which theories are useful starting points for the governance of climate adaptation? The chapter distinguishes between theories and concepts that focus on reflexivity, on resilience, on responsiveness and on revitalization. Instead of integrating these theories in one overarching governance approach, the chapter suggests an approach of theoretical multiplicity. It proposes that exploiting the variety of concepts and strategies based on the different theories can increase the governance capacity to deal with climate change. Finally, it addresses the moral dimension of wicked problems, which suggests that it is unacceptable to treat a wicked problem as though it were a tame one. Governance scholars nowadays risk raising expectations far beyond their ability to deliver, and thus enhance confusions over whether wicked problems are in fact tame ones." (author's abstract)

"The literature on interest group politics in the European Union has come of age. The last ten years we have seen a remarkable shift from a literature consisting of mainly empirics driven studies that remained detached from sophisticated conceptual reflection, to a firmly theory-informed field of empirical political science. The study of EU interest group politics has become more professionalised, as researchers have moved away from studies that had their merits on their own but often suffered from theoretical grandstanding or idiosyncratic topics and/or sui generis explanations, to studies that link theoretical and conceptual development with sound empirical hypothesis testing. The reason for this transformation is to be sought in changes in the discipline of political science and adjacent disciplines, but certainly just as well in the transformation of European politics with its decline of electoral party politics and the migration of the 'authoritative allocation of values' into policy networks and negotiation systems in which interest groups and civil society organisations assume prominent positions." (excerpt)

"With the ratification of the Reform Treaty, the European Union will be
based on two complementary principles: the principle of representative
democracy and the principle of participatory democracy. Even though the
two respective sub-headings in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Article I, 46
and Article I, 47) have been omitted, the Intergovernmental Conference did
not introduce any change in substance. Article 11 of the Reform Treaty
pledges to give citizens and representative associations a voice 'in all areas of
Union action', and to 'maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue
with representative associations and civil society', and it demands that the
Commission 'carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order
to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent'. With Clause
4, it now also endows citizens with the right to initiate an action. However,
first, that action is of one type only, i.e., 'where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties'.
Second, that action is valid only when 'not less than one million citizens
who are nationals of a significant number of Member States' engage in it.
Third, and most importantly, that action is only an invitation to the
Commission, one which the Commission is not obliged to accept." (excerpt)

In the wake of globalization, national governments are becoming increasingly interdependent, and knowledge is arguably becoming the most valuable form of capital. Helmut Willke’s Smart Governance offers a new perspective on global governance from the vantage point of a global knowledge society. Through a case study of the global financial system and an analysis of several governance regimes, Willke contends that markets, legal systems, and morality must evolve to cope with uncertainty, build capacities, and achieve resilience. The resulting volume will change the way economists, historians, and political scientists view international cooperation. Zwei Megatrends steigern den Bedarf an intelligenter Systemsteuerung: die Globalisierung und der Wandel von der Industrie- zur Wissensgesellschaft. Das Buch bietet eine neue Sicht auf die Problematik der globalen Governance und beschreibt die Vielfalt bereits erkennbarer globaler Steuerungsmodi in den Bereichen Wirtschaft, Ethik und Finanzsysteme. In diesem Kontext werden unter anderem die Problemfelder der Kompetenz und der Flexibilität analysiert.

In our globalized world, competition for capital is intense and only jurisdictions with superior corporate governance will attract the FDI crucial for economic growth and development.29 Corporate governance encompasses numerous aspects of how a business is governed and the relationship between the company and various stakeholders. An important marker of good corporate governance is transparent and reliable financial reporting since investment decisions are based on financial statements which must be reliable and trustworthy. Indeed, accurate
financial reporting of publicly-traded companies constitutes "the" source of information for a myriad of stakeholders including: company manager; shareholders, government regulators and potential investors

"This chapter deals with the challenge of policy definition, cooperation and coordination in a complex system of multi-level governance faced by decision-makers in international politics today, using the example of international climate governance. The practical, as well as the analytical challenge, of said system of multi-level governance lies in its dynamic structure, which includes the vertical (i.e. domestic and foreign; subnational, national, and international) and horizontal levels (structure of decision-making processes in international institutions) of international politics, the participation of non-state actors, and the inter-linkages and interdependencies between all policy fields and levels involved. More often than not, intentions and interests on the different levels are disparate and difficult to harmonize, which can result in less than ideal policy strategies, are likely to 'get lost' in the multi-level governance system. International climate governance and the difficulties with institutionalizing an all-encompassing climate protection strategy can be seen as an example of a policy field that is 'lost in multi-level governance.' This will be illustrated in the following chapter by analyzing five dimensions of climate governance and how they hamper successful climate governance-and thus climate protection-at the international level." (author's abstract)