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Purpose
Growing social concerns and ecological issues accelerate firms' environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement. Hence, this study aims to advance the existing literature by focusing on the interplay between institutional and firm governance mechanisms for greater ESG engagement. More specifically, the authors investigate whether public governance stimulates excessive ESG engagement and whether corporate governance moderates this relationship.


Design/methodology/approach
Using a sample of 43,803 firm-year observations affiliated with 41 countries and 9 industries, the authors adopt a country, industry and year fixed-effects regression analysis.


Findings
The authors find that public governance strength via its six dimensions stimulates excessive ESG engagement. This implies that firms in countries with strong voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are more motivated for ESG engagement. Furthermore, corporate governance negatively moderates the relationship between all public governance dimensions (except political stability) and excessive ESG engagement. This implies that public governance and corporate governance are substitutes for encouraging firms to commit to ESG. Further tests reveal that whereas these results in the baseline analyses are valid for developed countries, they are not valid in emerging markets.


Research limitations/implications
The findings support the interplay between institutional and agency theories. In countries with strong (weak) institutional mechanisms, corporate governance becomes weak (strong) in inciting greater stakeholder engagement. This implies that the public governance mechanism alleviates agency costs, rendering internal mechanisms of corporate governance noncompulsory for ESG engagement.


Practical implications
The findings suggest that emerging countries need to reinforce their institutions for greater accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption, which will have a domino effect on firms in addressing stakeholder expectations. The results also advise emerging country firms to augment their internal monitoring mechanisms for greater stakeholder engagement, such as structuring boards and establishing corporate social responsibility mechanisms, committees and policies.


Originality/value
This study contributes to the recent literature investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms in excessive ESG engagement. The study also explores whether public governance is associated with greater ESG involvement and provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between six indicators of public governance quality and excessive ESG practices in developed and emerging economies.

This article examines how modes of governance are reconfigured as a result of using algorithms in the governance process. We argue that deploying algorithmic systems creates a shift toward a special form of design-based governance, with power exercised ex ante via choice architectures defined through protocols, requiring lower levels of commitment from governing actors. We use governance of three policy problems – speeding, disinformation, and social sharing – to illustrate what happens when algorithms are deployed to enable coordination in modes of hierarchical governance, self-governance, and co-governance. Our analysis shows that algorithms increase efficiency while decreasing the space for governing actors' discretion. Furthermore, we compare the effects of algorithms in each of these cases and explore sources of convergence and divergence between the governance modes. We suggest design-based governance modes that rely on algorithmic systems might be re-conceptualized as algorithmic governance to account for the prevalence of algorithms and the significance of their effects.

AbstractThis article examines how modes of governance are reconfigured as a result of using algorithms in the governance process. We argue that deploying algorithmic systems creates a shift toward a special form of design‐based governance, with power exercisedex antevia choice architectures defined through protocols, requiring lower levels of commitment from governing actors. We use governance of three policy problems – speeding, disinformation, and social sharing – to illustrate what happens when algorithms are deployed to enable coordination in modes of hierarchical governance, self‐governance, and co‐governance. Our analysis shows that algorithms increase efficiency while decreasing the space for governing actors' discretion. Furthermore, we compare the effects of algorithms in each of these cases and explore sources of convergence and divergence between the governance modes. We suggest design‐based governance modes that rely on algorithmic systems might be re‐conceptualized as algorithmic governance to account for the prevalence of algorithms and the significance of their effects.

This article argues that it is necessary to unpack and appropriately separate the concepts of democracy and governance. The impetus for this research comes from the ongoing and expanding convolution of the concepts of democracy and governance by academics, international institutions and policymakers. One of the more important areas of research that is affected by this convolution argues that democracies guarantee the rule of law and provide superior institutions which considerably influence not only developing states' overall development trajectories, but also multinational firms' decisions on where to do business. I argue that these superior institutions, such as the rule of law and quality bureaucracy, are separate from the institutions of democracy and constitute the concept of governance infrastructure. Moreover, it is the institutions that comprise governance infrastructure and not the institutions of democracy that are key institutional determinants of developing states' economic outcomes. Therefore, only by appropriately conceptualizing governance infrastructure, as is done in this article, and separating it theoretically and empirically from democracy will scholars and policymakers move forward in understanding the determinants of economic development.

Who governs when nobody governs ?" This question is addressed by looking at phenomena that have become characteristic of cities today: violence, crime, immigration, mobility. Answering this question also requires paying more attention to different forms of regulation : state, market, along with cooperative/reciprocal modes of regulation. Risk embodies these different forms : it has become a common way of framing and addressing a wide variety of urban problems, suggesting that to govern is to identify and to manage vulnerabilities through different modes of regulation. Lastly, the question points to the uncertainty that characterizes city borders : these are constantly being redefined both by demographics, urbanization and political reforms.

Who governs when nobody governs ?" This question is addressed by looking at phenomena that have become characteristic of cities today: violence, crime, immigration, mobility. Answering this question also requires paying more attention to different forms of regulation : state, market, along with cooperative/reciprocal modes of regulation. Risk embodies these different forms : it has become a common way of framing and addressing a wide variety of urban problems, suggesting that to govern is to identify and to manage vulnerabilities through different modes of regulation. Lastly, the question points to the uncertainty that characterizes city borders : these are constantly being redefined both by demographics, urbanization and political reforms.

Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds.

This book seeks to pose and explore a question that sheds light on the contested but largely cooperative nature of Arctic governance in the post-Cold War period: how does power matter - and how has it mattered - in shaping cross-border cooperation and diplomacy in the Arctic? Each chapter functions as a window through which power relations in the Arctic are explored. Issues include how representing the Arctic region matters for securing preferred outcomes, how circumpolar cooperation is marked by regional hierarchies and how Arctic governance has become a global social site in its own right, replete with disciplining norms for steering diplomatic behaviour. This book draws upon Russia's role in the Arctic Council as an extended case study and examines how Arctic cross-border governance can be understood as a site of competition over the exercise of authority

The Lake Governance book will focus on comparative analysis of governance structures by examining policy, legal and institutional structures of current transboundary commissions to develop a common framework for good governance of transboundary lakes. Cooperation among nations sharing natural resources is important for sustainable use of the shared resources. Lakes contribute a big part to GDP in most of the countries and in some cases are also responsible for providing fisheries (for food, source of protein and livelihood) Climate change and associated risks and uncertainties add more complexity to the problems. This book will explore current water governance challenges, knowledge gaps and recommend a framework for good lake governance.

The Lake Governance book will focus on comparative analysis of governance structures by examining policy, legal and institutional structures of current transboundary commissions to develop a common framework for good governance of transboundary lakes. Cooperation among nations sharing natural resources is important for sustainable use of the shared resources. Lakes contribute a big part to GDP in most of the countries and in some cases are also responsible for providing fisheries (for food, source of protein and livelihood) Climate change and associated risks and uncertainties add more complexity to the problems. This book will explore current water governance challenges, knowledge gaps and recommend a framework for good lake governance.