Protectionism through legislative layering: Implications for auditors and investors

Abstract

Protectionism is on the rise. Although it tends to be associated with tariffs on imports, governments are increasingly applying other mechanisms to influence international business. Import substitution initiatives have been used to replace purchases from foreign producers with local alternatives. Russia implemented import substitution through legislative layering where layers of regulation created requirements targeting different industries and companies. Following sanctions imposed in 2014 on Russia, the government responded with additional import substitution efforts. We are interested in effects of such measures on the Big 4, global professional service firms, and the choice of auditors by partially privatized enterprises (PPEs). PPEs have more complex multilevel agency problems because it is less clear who is in charge. We find that companies with state ownership were more likely to switch away from the Big 4, and this was more pronounced for companies in strategic industries. It also contributed to companies switching from the Big 4 to the next tier of audit firms. After 2015, PPEs were less likely to receive a modified audit opinion on IFRS audits. However, auditor changes did not occur at the cross-listed enterprises that are under enhanced monitoring from global investors and foreign stock exchanges. ; publishedVersion