Guns, money and politics: disorder in the Solomon Islands

Abstract

For many observers, the elections scheduled for late 2001 offered a possible circuit breaker to Solomon Islands' deepening political crisis. Behind the crisis lay four years of ethnic tensions, a de facto coup in June 2000, and a progressive collapse of the economy and, in many places, law and order. The incumbent Sogavare administration had come to power as a result of the coup instigated by an ethnically-based militia group, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), and elements of the paramilitary police field force. As a result, it had little legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon islanders and, moreover, appeared quite incapable of providing the leadership necessary to restore peace and stability. During its period in office, the economy had gone into free fall, with all major commercial enterprises suspended, and there was growing evidence of systematic conuption and plunder among political leaders, senior officials, and their militant associates. Since the coup, Honiara, the national capital on Guadalcanal, had been under the effective control of bands of anned militants. The police force remained deeply divided and was no longer able or willing to enforce the law. Sadly, the new government formed after the December 2001 elections and led by Sir Allan Kemakeza has not lived up to expectations. It is made up of remnants of the Sogavare administration and includes several high-profile former members of the MEF. While there have been some signs of improvement, including in the critical area of disarmament, the national economy continues to verge on bankruptcy, essential services have ceased in many places, public servants go unpaid, and corruption and lack of security remain serious concerns. The Kernakeza government appears incapable of leading the Solomon Islands out of its current predicament and, in the view of many observers, there is a clear need for far greater engagement by the main regional players, notably Australia and New Zealand.