Ar referendumu siūlomos įstatymo nuostatos galimas neatitikimas konstitucijai yra pakankamas pagrindas atsisakyti skelbti referendumą? ; Does a Possible Noncompliance of a Proposal with the Constitution Provides Sufficient Legal Ground to Refuse to Hold a Referendum on an Amendment of the Constitution?

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the whether the termination of a referendum initiative is valid if based of an unofficial interpretation of the Constitution. The core questions, investigated in this thesis consists of whether the refusal to hold a referendum concerning a legal draft, which potentially does not meet the requirements arising from the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania constrain the citizens right to a referendum; can the Central Election Commission's and the Parliament's constitutional evaluation towards the citizens provided legal draft can be interpreted as some sort constitutional control. The arisen problem is examined in three parts of this thesis. The first parts presents background to this situation. On 2014 July 11'th the Constitutional Court of Lithuania adopted a resolution which the interpreted the additional powers to the Central Election Commission and the Parliament. This resolution established, that in order to prevent unconstitutional constitutional amendments to the Constitution, the Central Election Commission and the Parliament must be granted the jurisdiction to prevent such a referendum to take place, if it would be non-compliant with the fundamental provisions established in the Constitution or would lead to unconstitutional consequences. These powers themselves created an obligation, both to the Central Election Commission and the Parliament to check the contents of the submitted legal draft and to evaluate its compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Given the fact that a submitted legal draft is certain for constitutional checks not only in form, but also in terms of content, the question arises, what criteria should the Central Election Commission and the Parliament follow. For this reason, this part analyses what the fundamental constitutional values are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and what kind of the safeguard mechanism is instilled. These criteria will provide a some sort of basis that could be determined in accordance with the legal draft. The second part deals with the situation where the Central Electoral Commission, within its jurisdiction, stated that a citizens' group submitted legal draft law does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution, thus shall not be put to vote in a referendum. For the same reason, the Parliament must refuse to hold a citizens' initiated referendum, even if such an initiative is at a request of 300 thousand citizens. Due to the fact that the requirement to call to provide 300 thousand signatures itself shows that the subject at hand is attributable to the major questions of the country. Parliament's refusal to hold such a referendum would not be an infringement of the sovereign powers held by the people. However, the question arises whether the refusal to call a referendum based on a legal draft, which potentially do not meet the requirements arising from the Constitution disproportionately restricts the right to call a referendum, which should by guaranteed by the Constitution. For this reason, this part will examine what are the real prospects to initiate and to call a referendum in Lithuania on behalf of the citizens, assessing how these perspectives have changed since the Constitutional Court adopted the mentioned resolution. This analysis will reveal possibility of a citizens' initiative and referendum, this analysis will determine whether the existing legal regulation does not create disproportionate difficulties in the implementation of the right to a referendum. The third part deals with the Lithuanian's Constitutional Court's exclusive right to interpret the concept of the Constitution; the analysis of the Central Electoral Commission's and the Parliament's content of powers and the constitutional practices of foreign countries. For this reason, this part will address the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania's prerogative to interpret the concept of the Constitution and why this exclusive right belongs to the Constitutional Court of Lithuania. This part will analyze whether the Central Electoral Commission and the Parliament right, to analyze the citizens provided legal draft in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania implements functions consisting a degree of constitutional control as well as the implementation of such a practice should be seen in relation to the recommendations of the Venice Commission. This analysis will answer the question of whether the current legal regulation creates preconditions for citizens' groups to be rejected the referendum provided by a bill based on an unofficial interpretation of the Constitution. The analysis revealed that the only authority competent to assess the legal draft submitted for referendum, compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, since only the Constitutional Court has the exclusive right to interpretation of constitutional rules, which can cause legal consequences. Given the fact that the interpretation of the Constitution is the Constitutional Court exclusive right and that only the official interpretation of the Constitution should lead would lead to legal consequences, it must be concluded that the possible non-compliance of the Constitution setting, based on an unofficial interpretation is not sufficient enough to refuse to hold a referendum. The Central Election Commission has not been provided with an opportunity to apply to the Constitutional Court questioning the submitted legal draft; a legal draft law, according to the Legal Code of Administrative Cases, is not subject of interpretation by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, therefor it also not a subject of interpretation to the Constitutional Court. The Lithuanian Parliament adopted resolutions can possibly be subject of constitutional control, but that depends entirely on the will of the members of the Parliament. Evaluating these circumstances, it must be concluded that the Lithuania's current legal regulation of does not meet the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The absence of a clear possibility for a legal draft to be submitted for interpretation by the Constitutional Court, limits the right to an referendum initiative on behalf of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania also preventing the referendum in accordance with unofficial interpretation of the Constitution. In accordance with these circumstances, it was found that both of the Parliament and the Central Election Commission's decision to refuse to register a referendum initiative or to hold a referendum on the basis, that the legal draft non-compliant with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is considered an unofficial interpretation of the Constitution that cannot be a sufficient to restrict the citizens constitutional right to a referendum.