A many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'

Abstract

© 2014 Elsevier B.V. We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold. ; F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009-01142), and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011-29847) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) ; Peer Reviewed