RAWLS AND DEONTOLOGICAL LIBERALISM

Abstract

We would philosophically analyze the underlying foundations of right in the metaphysical morality of Kant and that empirical and sociological inclination of Rawls towards Kantian conception of person. We believe that Rawls shifts from the Kantian conception of person which is a transcendental self. However, he does not altogether detach himself with the project of deontological ethics i.e. priority of right over the good. If we critically analyze the Rawlsian methodology of deontological ethics, we may scrutinize ontological reasons or grounds beyond his deontological ethics. Central theme of the moral theory is that of the theory of person. We must critically analyze the Kantian perspective on the deontological ethics. In this article we would excavate the fact that liberalism prioritizes a particular conception of good, which is higher good of liberal political society. It has priority over all other moral comprehensive doctrines, which is contradiction of deontological liberalism e.g. priority of right over the good. In the same realm of reasoning, it would emerge that Rawlsian Liberalism confines theory of justice to only liberal societies. In this way, this theory is not cross-culturally applicable and would only regulate liberal societies at large. We would discuss that super powers have lost their credibility to teach constitutional democracy to the non-liberal world under this theory which restrains deontological ethics as culturally specific and historically determined.