Autochthonous constitutional design in post-colonial Singapore: Intimations of Confucianism and the Leviathan in entrenching dominant government

Abstract

Does Singapore's approach to institutional design vis-avis political representation prioritize strong and effective government, or is the goal one that is geared towards a representative government as a means of enhancing political governance? his paper examines the series of amendments to Singapore's Constitution and related legislation, between 1984 and 1990, and in 2010, which relate to political representation in Singapore's electoral system and unicameral legislature. At one level, the changes are part of the endeavor to retain Parliament's standing as the focal point of Singapore's Westminstermodeled system of government. The constitutional changes reflect the political elites' abiding belief that institutional design must produce a government with a clear mandate, demonstrated through a strong parliamentary majority, for it to govern resolutely and decisively in the long-term interests of Singapore. However, even as the changes are presented as a public interest endeavor to enhance Parliament's representativeness, the legislative changes marginalize the importance of representation in Singapore's parliamentary democracy.