Dynamic Voting in Clubs
In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:09bf0233-826e-48de-bb97-faa5f96f674c
Abstract
This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE - STICERD
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