Principles and policies: once more

Abstract

The chapter tries to bring clarity to the legal theoretical debate by distinguishing between different senses of 'legal principle' and by analysing these in the framework of the multi-layered nature of law. Thus, the decision principles which Dworkin and Alexy have discussed as applicable legal norms, alongside legal rules, are not exactly the same as the general legal principles summarizing the normative premises of a distinct branch of law or the normative legal order as a whole. The chapter also defends the distinction between principles and policies embraced by Dworkin but downplayed by Alexy. The distinction facilitates understanding how positive law can accomplish the crucial function of self-limitation. The distinction is also important for perceiving the particularity of EU law as a policy-oriented legal order; a characteristic feature which forms a backdrop to EU law's conflicts with the more principle-oriented national legal regimes of Member States ; Peer reviewed