Argentina: Are vertical transfers deteriorating sub-national governments revenue effort?

In: II Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Financiación Local (La Plata, 2013)

Abstract

Vertical transfers in Argentina have encouraged an expansion of provincial expenditures. In this paper we estimate the impact of vertical transfers on own-source sub-national revenue effort. The results suggest provinces react differently to central government transfers, depending on the nature of the transfer. Automatic transfers are consumed and, at the same time, they increase the tax bases of some provincial taxes easing higher revenues. This reaction is consistent with a permanent income shock. But discretionary transfers are seen as temporary income. Provinces use part of them to increase capital expenditures and another part to reduce own taxes. This reduction may be reversed later if the political game (or shortages of funds) force a reduction for the discretional amounts received from the Federal government. This is a particular type of the "flypaper effect". ; Departamento de Economía