Critique as (preceding) Political Autonomy

Abstract

In spite of its authority to claim facts, law is by no means neutral. Deeply imbued with economic and ideological interests, opportunistic goals and hidden motives, its function to guarantee political autonomy has been deeply compromised. This observation, systematically explored in Critical Legal Studies, is the point of departure for this essay. In asking how (a greater degree of ) political autonomy may be achieved, it puts forward an understanding of autonomy along three conceptual distinctions. As (1) self-governance of the individual and the community (Personal and Political Autonomy), (2) as self-governance bereft of external and internal constraints (External and Internal Autonomy), and (3) self-governance as the absence of constraints and the capacity to exercise governance (Negative and Positive Autonomy). The main argument is that critique is not only the prerequisite but also the essence of political autonomy. In discussing four authors that have vitally contributed to the enterprise of the critique of law (Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Freud) it attempts to disentangle the ways in which critique is essential for disposing of self-instituting capacity. I propose a reading that does not engage with the differences between their theories but stresses their commonality. While distinct in their analysis of the constraints responsible for the lack of political autonomy, their desire for the individual's liberation of (economic, ideological, despotic, subconscious) forces provides a common ground. Therefore, their critique can be understood as an enterprise deeply indebted to Kant. Not as a rejection of Enlightenment but as an effort to transform it from within.