European democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean

Abstract

International democracy promotion has always been contentious – today perhaps more than ever. Examples from the European neighborhood testify to this: analysts argue that democracy promotion is one of the key reasons for the worsening of relations between Russia and the West after 2011. The successive achievements of externally promoted so-called 'color revolutions' (in Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004) rattled Russian President Vladimir Putin, in particular after the post-election anti-government protests in Russia in 2011-2012. Putin viewed these protests as a direct threat to the current Russian political system and, importantly, as orchestrated from the West (McFaul, 2014). In 2014 he stated that "we see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to. For us this is a lesson and a warning. We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in Russia" (cited in Korsunskaya, 2014). A second example comes from the Southern Mediterranean: after the Arab uprisings Europe was roundly criticized for its lip service to democracy in the region. In fact, the European Union (EU) had combined democracy assistance programs with solid support for authoritarian leaders such as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed VI of Morocco (Hollies, 2012). Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), admitted as much: "We must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region," he stressed in early 2011, adding that Europe should be standing with pro-democracy demonstrators and not "dictators" killing their citizens (Füle, 2011). ; peer-reviewed