Development banks and the syndicate structure: Evidence from a world sample

Abstract

Do development banks influence syndicate structure? Using a global dataset across 48 countries of 11,949 syndicated loans from 2001 to 2016, we show that lead banks decrease their loan shares and form less concentrated structures in mixed syndicates that include both development banks and private-sector banks as participant lenders. In line with the social view on the role of development banks, we find that such an effect is stronger during periods of financial instability, particularly for the green industry and in the case of borrowers that are financially constrained. Conversely, we do not find any evidence that mixed syndicates exhibit a different syndicate structure for political distortions. Lastly, we find that mixed syndicates are not associated with higher covenant violations and an increasing of the borrowers' risk profile after the loan origination. Our results are robust when accounting for, among others, relationship lending, asymmetric information within the syndicate, lenders' lending expertise, borrowers' opacity, types of loan, and ranking hierarchy in the syndicate.