THE DEVIL IS IN THE PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATION PROCESSES IN TRILOGUES ON EU LEGISLATION

In: http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/397293

Abstract

More than 90% of EU legislation is negotiated in so-called trilogues. In this specific institutional setup, representatives of three legislative institutions – the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament – come together to negotiate EU legislation behind closed doors. Applying different theoretical perspectives on negotiations, this study analyses the interaction between institutional actors in the negotiation process. Focusing on the interaction of negotiators, the institutional venue of negotiations and the negotiation mode, the study finds that the way the negotiation process develops has clear repercussions on the legislative outcome. First, the more negotiators personally interact, the more trust develops between them. This has three consequences: it shifts negotiations to more informal venues (including less actors), and the negotiations become more cooperative. This increases the degree to which initial institutional positions can be found in the final agreement. Moreover, delegation of the negotiation – to hierarchically lower level staff and administrators – also leads to more cooperative negotiations, and, furthermore, to more technical expertise of those actors involved. It does, hence, not only increase the inclusion of initial positions in the outcome but also increases the overall legal quality of legislation. In sum, this study shows that the negotiation process in trilogues – and especially a shift to ever more remote venues of negotiations – has an impact on the outcome. And while, from a democratic point of view, these procedural aspects might be seen critically, they by and large have a positive impact on the results of the negotiations.