Models of judicial administration and the independence of the judiciary: a comparison of Romanian self‐management and the Czech executive model

In: Public administration and development: the international journal of management research and practice, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 85-93

Abstract

AbstractThe Rule of Law is a necessary condition for economic, social and political development in countries undergoing transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The Rule of Law requires an independent judiciary, one that is impartial and insular. In Eastern Europe democratic transition has produced two models of judicial administration: judicial self‐management and the executive model. Romania is a case of the former, the Czech Republic an instance of the latter. Comparison of the two cases suggests that while political developments are important to the preservation of judicial independence, the consolidation of democracy and the organisation of the judiciary are in a reciprocal relationship. The organisation of the judiciary is necessary for the legislative transparency and oversight of the executive branch which in turn guards against the politicisation of judicial management, with its adverse consequences for the independence of the judiciary and ultimately the Rule of Law. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.