Exercising abilities

In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 3, S. 2495-2509

Abstract

AbstractAccording to one prominent view of exercising abilities (e.g., Millar in Acta Anal 24(4):223–236, 2009), a subject, S, counts as exercising an ability to $$ \phi $$
ϕ
if and only if S successfully $$ \phi $$
ϕ
s. Such an 'exercise-success' thesis looks initially very plausible for abilities, perhaps even obviously or analytically true. In this paper, however, I will be defending the position that one can in fact exercise an ability to do one thing by doing some entirely distinct thing, and in doing so I'll highlight various reasons (epistemological, metaphysical and linguistic) that favor the alternative approach I develop over views that hold that the exercise of an ability is a success notion in the sense Millar maintains.