Realism, perspectivism, and disagreement in science

In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S25, S. 6115-6141

Abstract

AbstractThis paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of 'agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing' with an episode from the history of modern physics: namely,
how we came to agree about the electric charge as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906.