Hyperintensionality and overfitting
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 203, Heft 4
Abstract
AbstractA hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson's Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
ISSN: 1573-0964
DOI
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