A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective

In: American political science review, Band 99, Heft 3, S. 327-346

Abstract

Both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. In this article, I propose asequential theory of decentralizationthat has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as aprocess, (2) it takes into account theterritorial interestsof bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporatespolicy feedback effects. I argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure this evolution in the four largest Latin American countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (Colombia and Argentina). I show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.