Représentation des intérêts et législation commerciale au Sénat des États-Unis

In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 277-292

Abstract

AbstractWhat explains the action of United States legislators in matters of international trade? Do they only respond to protectionist pressures or are they also responsive to pressures from groups favourable to free trade? Is their vote primarily influenced by diffuse or concentrated interests? What is the role played by ideology and partisanship in determining their vote? Given the increasingly important share of exports in the US economy in recent years, the presence in their constituencies of industries potentially hurt by more protectionist policies should influence the voting patterns of members of the US Congress to a similar extent as would the presence of import-sensitive industries. The analysis of a composite index of support for free trade suggests that US senators are not sensitive only to the protectionist demands of import-sensitive industries, but also to exporters' demands for the maintenance of policies consistent with a liberal trade regime. In sum, the political responsiveness that leads legislators to defend industries in their constituencies is not a one-way street. Interdependence means that it can also work to foster the maintenance of existing liberal policies.