Some Aspects of Economic Policy in Tanganyika, 1945–60

In: The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics & related topics in contemporary Africa, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 265-277

Abstract

An understanding of Tanganyika's economy must begin with the bleak geographical facts. In 1945 an area of some 343,000 square miles, larger than France and Britain together, supported a mere seven million people. The size and distribution of this population resulted from an oppressive physical environment over which remarkably little human control was exerted. One example of this was man's subservience to the tsetse fly, which—as a result rather than a cause of under-population1— infested some 60 per cent of the land. Even more serious were the hazards of a rainfall that exhibited all the vices—inadequate and irregular in its geographical distribution, capricious in its seasonal visitations. Prolonged periods of drought were common everywhere except at the coast and near Lakes Victoria and Nyasa. As the overwhelming majority of the people were subsistence producers, the incidence of rainfall was a principal and variable determinant of economic welfare. Thus, for example, 1946 was a bad year; there were food shortages in every province and in some areas the Government had to organise famine relief. The rice crop failed almost completely, maize was grievously affected, and even sorghum and millet, the most drought-resistant of grain crops, were sufficient for only half the year. In the following year rainfall was heavy and well distributed; indeed in the Highlands it was excessive, destroying crops through flood and disease. But generally harvests were the biggest since 1943 and 'a long back-log of tribal ceremonies' was elebrated.2