Aufsatz(elektronisch)23. November 2020

Contractarian ideology and the legitimacy of government

In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 379-391

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Abstract

AbstractSocial contract theory depicts a constitutional contract as the result of a hypothetical agreement among society's members to escape a prisoners' dilemma situation. It depicts citizens as political equals agreeing to be forced into a cooperative strategy rather than a socially suboptimal strategy that gives them the highest personal payoff. Government is the organization that forces everyone to cooperate. However, citizens can never bargain as political equals. An elite few design the rules, and others are forced to comply with them. The contractarian ideology that depicts government as acting in the general public interest legitimizes the actions of government, giving those elite few who hold government power a greater ability to use it to further their own interests, often at the expense of the masses. Within the context of a prisoners' dilemma game, contractarian ideology leads to an outcome that is socially suboptimal, but beneficial for the political elite.

Sprachen

Englisch

Verlag

Cambridge University Press (CUP)

ISSN: 1744-1382

DOI

10.1017/s1744137420000521

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