Subnational constitutional courts and judicialization in Germany
In: European political science: EPS, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 648-665
Abstract
AbstractThis paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Länder. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
ISSN: 1682-0983
DOI
Problem melden