Creating common sense: getting NATO to Afghanistan
In: Journal of transatlantic studies: the official publication of the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA), Band 19, Heft 2, S. 138-166
Abstract
AbstractThis article raises the question of how NATO became bogged down in Afghanistan. I scrutinise how the alliance became involved in Afghanistan and how it formulated its strategy. In doing this, I follow the general premises of practice theory. However, instead of the common focus on diplomats and their everyday doings, this article suggests an approach that pays more attention to the structure of the field of positions. I demonstrate that the actions of permanently seconded representatives of member states and of NATO's administrative cadre were crucial in drawing the alliance into Afghanistan. I argue that their actions significantly contributed to the creation of a fatal common sense: namely that the alliance had to become and remain engaged even in the absence of clear political goals. This provided the basis for a means-focused and endless mission.
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
ISSN: 1754-1018
DOI
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