Aufsatz(elektronisch)Februar 2000
An Antidumping Law Can Be procompetitive
In: Pacific economic review, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 5-14
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Abstract
Home and foreign duopolists collude in the absence of an antidumping (AD) law because competition law makes renegotiation of collusion more costly than imposition of punishment for defection. Introduction of an AD law with a weak injury standard can undermine collusion by providing a low‐cost mechanism for renegotiation. This induces dumping by the foreign firm and defection by the home firm. An AD law can be procompetitive, in contrast to recent literature suggesting that an AD law can facilitate collusion. The law is asymmetric, providing a greater incentive for home‐firm than foreign‐firm deviation.
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