The Secular Decline in Presidential Domestic Policy Making: An Organizational Perspective

In: Presidential studies quarterly: official publication of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 779-792

Abstract

What has caused the secular (long‐term) decline in presidential domestic policy‐making activities over the past several decades? In a previously published article in this journal, Paul Light provides several interesting speculative reasons for this trend. I propose a general explanation for the secular decline in presidential domestic policy making that centers on the rising organizational size and scope of the institutional presidency. Specifically, I argue that the American presidency's greater than optimal organizational size and scope has hurt its domestic policy‐making activities in absolute terms. The suboptimal organizational size and scope of the presidency has also led to a deterioration of its institutional comparative advantage in policy‐making activities vis‐à‐vis Congress. Therefore, twenty‐first century American presidents possess a strong incentive to restrict the organizational size and scope of the Executive Office of the President as a means to strive for optimal institutional performance.