The Historical Presidency: A Theoretical Critique of the Unitary Executive Framework: Rethinking the First‐Mover Advantage, Collective‐Action Advantage, and Informational Advantage

In: Presidential studies quarterly: official publication of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 169-185

Abstract

The unitary executive framework assumes that all presidents hold the same structural advantages relative to Congress or the Court—a first‐mover advantage, a collective‐action advantage, and an informational advantage. Therefore, variation is sought in changes in peripheral institutional conditions such as party control of the presidency, congressional support, and public approval. In this article, I provide a theoretical critique of the unitary executive framework. I show that its foundational assumptions do not hold in practice, and I develop an argument based on the simple idea that systems of administration for individual policy domains change substantially from time to time. Specifically, I contend that when the president relies on the established collective‐action and informational arrangement, it often obstructs or compromises his first‐mover advantage. Conversely, the president's first‐mover advantage in a policy domain is strengthened when he restructures the established collective‐action and informational arrangement.