Transgovernmental Networks as Regulatory Intermediaries: Horizontal Collaboration and the Realities of Soft Power

In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 670, Heft 1, S. 245-262

Abstract

This article explores and elucidates the activities of transnational networks as regulatory intermediaries. Specifically, I examine their role in the regulation of banks, as far as they facilitate exchanges between global regulators (GRs)—such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or the Financial Stability Board—and local regulators (LRs), such as national regulatory agencies or legislatures. I find that transgovernmental network intermediaries produce benefits both for GRs, which employ them to disseminate their rules; and for LRs, which use them to obtain influence, advice, and information. Networks promote collaborative intermediation horizontally, without compromising sovereignty, and require only soft organizational structures with low operational costs. Network intermediation is a key ingredient in facilitating local regulatory activities and in providing tools and cognitive resources to LRs. Network intermediaries blur the global-local boundary, however, as some of their members operate as LRs and simultaneously participate directly in GRs.