Patterns of Soviet Policy toward the Middle East

In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 482, Heft 1, S. 40-64

Abstract

Soviet policy toward the Middle East since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war has been essentially reactive in nature, as Moscow has reacted to events in the region that it neither caused nor had much ability to control. Moscow has benefited from some events, such as the fall of the shah, the formation of an Arab anti-Camp David alignment, and U.S. policy errors in Lebanon. Just as frequently, however, Moscow's position in the Middle East has suffered from regional events, such as the movement of Egypt into the American camp, the outbreak and continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, and the numerous internecine splits in the Arab world. The arms that Moscow has poured into the Middle East have not given Moscow much influence in the region. Thus Moscow could not prevent Egypt's exit from the Soviet camp, the signing of the Camp David agreements, or the reestablishment of relations between Egypt and Jordan. Despite continued efforts, the USSR has been unable to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq war or the rift between Assad and Arafat, nor has it gained solid support for the various versions of its Arab-Israeli peace plan.