Aufsatz(elektronisch)21. Februar 2022
Social Power and Non-cooperative Game Theory
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 262-279
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Abstract
This paper defends the use of non-cooperative game theory for analysing questions of governance. To do so it posits a way of extending the resource account of social power from cooperative games to noncooperative games in a way that side steps a range of criticism. This involves identifying tipping points in the reputations of certain agents for paying and punishing those in their thrall. These tipping points are what give threats and offers their credibility in the absence of enforcement mechanisms and stabilise the distribution of social resources in society.
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