Aufsatz(elektronisch)10. April 2022

Interbranch Warfare: Senate Amending Process and Restrictive House Rules

In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 279-291

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Abstract

While the U.S. House and Senate differ in many significant ways, perhaps the most important is the ability of House leaders to control the legislative process through the usage of special rules, which establish the terms of debate on a bill and can limit the number and content of amendments allowed. House members of both the majority and minority party have complained about their recent increased usage. In contrast, the Senate lacks a comparable tool and scholars have reported sharp increases in the number of floor amendments being proposed. In this paper, we examine the increase in proposed floor amendments in the Senate; arguing that, in addition to an increased value from electoral position-taking, the procedures employed in the House influence the floor behavior of senators. Specifically, we find that senators are more likely to offer amendments to bills that were passed under a restrictive rule in the House.

Sprachen

Englisch

Verlag

SAGE Publications

ISSN: 1938-274X

DOI

10.1177/10659129221082321

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