The influence of electoral institutions on legislative representation: Evidence from Japan's single non-transferable vote and single-member district systems

In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 209-221

Abstract

This study aims to offer empirical evidence of how electoral systems influence the way legislators represent their constituencies. In particular, it analyses the influence of electoral systems on legislators' representations in terms of a pattern of policy areas represented by them. By comparing legislators' behaviour under Japan's multi-member district, single non-transferable vote and single-member district systems, I demonstrate that electoral systems with higher district magnitude (i.e. higher number of seats per district) are more likely to offer electoral incentives for legislators to represent specific benefits, including particularistic interests in targeted policy areas. On the other hand, electoral systems with lower district magnitude are more likely to provide electoral incentives for representing diverse benefits, including general interests in various policy areas.