States as social entities: Re-examining the assumption of mutual disinterest in Rawls' Law of Peoples

In: Journal of international political theory: JIPT, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 224-238

Abstract

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls modeled peoples as being independent and mutually disinterested. This is an assumption that mirrors his treatment of individual persons in the domestic context. This article argues that this assumption does not translate to the international context. While individual persons do not require the existence of other persons, states cannot exist independently of other states. Because statehood is a social construct, states require the recognition (and the existence) of other states, and they are incapable of being considered independently of the system and the other states that populate the system. Drawing on aspects of the relational dimension of care ethics, this article considers the implications of rejecting the assumption of independence and mutual disinterest. Theorizing states as inherently connected to one another allows the relationships and connections among them to come into the process of developing principles of justice.