Aufsatz(elektronisch)1. Dezember 2007
Overconfidence, Insurance, and Paternalism
In: American economic review, Band 97, Heft 5, S. 1994-2004
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieser Artikel ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar: |
elektronisch
gedruckt
Abstract
It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioral biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G22)
Problem melden