Standard Setting and the Theory of Institutional Choice: The Case of Pollution Control

In: Policy & politics, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 421-424

Abstract

The argument presented by Majone in a recent article in Policy and Politics may be summarized thus: By all objective criteria effluent charges can be shown to be superior to other policies for controlling discharges to waterways, yet there is a reluctance among policy makers to their usage. He concludes that since it is unreasonable to assume that policy makers are stupid, or blindly prejudiced, the only possible explanation is that the self-interest of the politician or bureaucrat must be interfering with his objectivity.
It is not the purpose of this note to assert that politicians or bureaucrats are always concerned to maximize public welfare, however defined, or – to use Breton's phrase – to 'minimize the degree of coercion.' Instead, it is intended to outline the pitfalls of an approach which justifies unequivocably a policy and proceeds to conclude that because of its non-introduction legislators are pursuing antisocial objectives. Specifically, the balance of the effluent charge versus the standards approach will be redressed.
Majone states that effluent charges are an efficient method of achieving a specified water quality, but that the restriction of quantities discharged in physical form (by the 'consent' system in the U.K. context) requires information too costly to be collected.