Intelligibilität und Normativität

In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 231-248

Abstract

Abstract
Actions are intelligible to the extent that their agents know what they are doing and are able to make sense of their own behaviour. It is widely held, both in tradition as well as in current philosophical debate about practical reasons, that this requires people to act for reasons they consider normative: Agents must see something good about their actions. This article argues against such a conceptual restriction on intelligibility. Not only can people act intentionally without acting for normative reasons as they would be mentioned in contexts of justification. It is also possible for us to understand our own actions without believing that they are supported by good reasons. The constitutive aim of intentional action, which is intelligibility, is distinct from the ideal of being able to consider one's actions as right and good. It is desirable, however, that we can understand our own actions not merely by reference to any reasons but to reasons that we regard as good ones.