Is there a place for psychology in the framework of rational choice theory?

In: Filozofija i društvo, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 251-273

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss psychological aspect of rational choice theory.
The standard version of rational choice rests on a kind of psychology, since
it operates with mental states. In standard davidsonian version it is claimed
that we explain rational actions by stating proper desires and beliefs that
caused the action. We will explore two challenges to the standard version
that might be called cultural and naturalistic versions of rational choice.
Satz and Ferejohn (1994) challenged standard version by stating that we can
provide rational-choice explanations without relying too much on
psychological assumptions. They argued in favor of moderate externalism,
which should replace thin desire-belief model with thick structuralist
conception. According to their model moderate externalism is compatible with
realism about psychological states, while at the same time those states need
not figure in the best rational choice explanations of actions. The focus of
rational choice explanations therefore shifts to non-individual and
non-psychological entities, such as firms in explaining economic behavior,
parties in explaining functioning of democracy, etc. Although there is a
place for psychological states within a moderate externalism, those states
are not causally relevant. On Pettit?s account desires and beliefs figure in
rational choice explanations merely as ?standby causes?. They explain
resilience of certain behavior, not its actual cause. Quite contrary to
standard rational choice theory, the programming model (Pettit, 2002) defines
the neurophysiological level as more basic in explaining behavior. This means
that higher-level psychological states are causally relevant for certain
behavior only if certain lower-level neurophysiological producer obtains. In
this paper standard rational choice theory will be defended against
culturalist and naturalist criticism.