Mimesis and ideology - from Plato to Althusser

In: Filozofija i društvo, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 156-178

Abstract

The moment one imitates something, it sticks, it marks the imitator, there is
no innocent imitation. Imitation necessarily affects the one who imitates,
for better or (usually) for worse, and the making of a simple copy of
something necessarily affects the original. This is perhaps the briefest way
to describe Plato?s concerns about the nature of mimesis in the Republic. The
purpose of this paper is to give a brief account of looking at the mysterious
magic powers of mimesis and of attempts to counteract them. The topic is
massive, so the paper will concentrate on a few perspectives, starting with
the theatrical parable of St. Genesius, leading to Pascal and to Althusser?s
theory of ideology, then scrutinizing the ways in which modernity tried to
disentangle itself from mimesis (Brecht?s estrangement, Irigaray?s femininity
as mimesis, Badiou?s anti-mimetic stance, Freud?s account of magic and
Lacan?s account of enjoyment). What is the real of the mimetic spell which
has so vastly ramified aesthetic and political consequences? The paper
proposes a defense of mimesis, claiming that modernity, by relegating the
traditional art to the past of mimesis and representation, thereby maintained
a disavowed kernel of mimesis at its core.