Class and Mass in Pre-1964 Brazil: The Case of Rio de Janeir

In: Journal of Interamerican studies and world affairs, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 323-356

Abstract

Initial and prolonged military intervention in Brazil beginning with the events of 1964 has been the subject of considerable theorizing. Yet, relatively little data has been produced to support the various theories. As a consequence, scholars are left with a variety of imaginative and cogently stated options but without an ability to decide which of the choices most closely describes the political reality.Direct and prolonged military intervention has been linked to factors external and internal to the military. Theories emphasizing the change of foreign investment patterns beginning in the 1950s (Cardoso, 1973), the persistence of an authoritarian, perhaps, corporativistic culture (Skidmore, 1973; Roett, 1972; Schmitter, 1971 and 1973), economic malaise (Skidmore, 1967; Lewis, 1975; Fishlow, 1973) and the shortcomings of political parties and civilian leadership (Schneider, 1965 and 1971; Tavares, 1970; Stepan, 1971; Reisky de Dubnic, 1968), and stress elements external to the military. Others, the role of the Superior War College in shaping interventionist attitudes among the officer corps (Stepan, 1973) and the military's assumption of the moderating power orpoder moderator(Torres, 1966) stress elements internal to the military.