Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes

In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 709-719

Abstract

We may argue about the wisdom of announcing 'unconditional surrender' as an aim in the last major war," observes Schelling in his recent book, Arms and Influence—as one might expect, a brilliant and important study—"but seem to expect 'unconditional destruction' as a matter of course in another one" (p. 23). Secretary McNamara does in fact require "adequacy of our forces from the standpoint of convincing others that the initiation of general nuclear war would inevitably bring about" not their facing the choice between capitulation and devastation, but exclusively "their own destruction." Suppose the enemy underestimates our force and its defenses or exaggerates the obstacles he can put in our path—suppose, that is, we have failed to be "clear and convincing" about our capabilities. Assume that the enemy then attempts to disarm us, disarming himself in the act.