Remittances and Vote Buying

In: Latin American research review, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 689-707

Abstract

How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way
political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns?
Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing
them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view
of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of
clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among
these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the
aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key
attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the
electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets
for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their
distributive preferences.