Aufsatz(elektronisch)1983

Pétrole : un repli stratégique

In: Revue de l'OFCE, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 117-122

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Abstract

That oil production should currently be concentrated in the least cost-effective areas is a paradox which reveals the fragility of OPEC's price monopoly. The explanation lies in poorer prospects for growth, the emergence of new producers and the financial difficulties of some members of the cartel. Unless OPEC's prices are re-aligned on the production costs of competitors, its market share wMI inevitably shrink given current prospects of stagnation in oil consumption up to the year 2 000. However, OPEC remains the arbiter of supply in the short term. The London agreement showed that a massive reduction of stocks can be absorbed with only a limited fall in prices, leaving room for a subsequent strengthening of the market. In the future, a short-term instability of prices could therefore be combined with a long-term fall.

Sprachen

Französisch

Verlag

PERSEE Program

DOI

10.3406/ofce.1983.948

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