La guerre d'Irak : la stratégie du faible face à la puissance américaine

In: Politique étrangère: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 395-408

Abstract

The War in Iraq, the Strategy of the Weak in the Face of the American Superpower, by David BARAN
The recent conflict in Iraq has produced an uncertain vision of the real unfolding of events and of the Iraqi adversary. The Iraqi resistance was the object of a political and media campaign of disinformation aimed at projecting the image of a rapid war of liberation. The resistance did in reality develop a subtle strategy, constructed around the victimisation of the regime, the conciliation of the population and the organisation of an armed resistance, but which ultimately revealed itself to be inadequate. The extent of the disym-metry between Iraqi and American forces provoked a strong sense of helplessness within the Iraqi population which reinforced its apathy and the incoherence of its reactions: pockets of civilian resistance facecf the American offensive while an ultimate wave of defiance towards the regime provoked its betrayal by the military. Iraq did not believe in victory, while not believing in a "liberation" by saviours either, official déclarations having relentlessly assimilated the conflict to a war for Iraqi oil and against Islam. It is nevertheless on the forces of occupation that tne country is now banking in order to fulfill the hopes of the Iraqi people.